Implications of US Disengagement from the Middle East

By Efraim Inbar, BESA

Executive Summary
The United States is retreating from the Middle East. The adverse implications of this policy shift are manifold, including: the acceleration of Tehran’s drive to regional hegemony, the palpable risk of regional nuclear proliferation following the JCPOA, the spread of jihadist Islam, and Russia’s growing penetration of the region. Manifest US weakness is also bound to have ripple effects far beyond the Middle East, as global players question the value of partnership with an irresolute Washington.

Introduction
The United States is retreating from the Middle East. The adverse implications of this policy shift are manifold, including: the acceleration of Tehran’s drive to regional hegemony, the palpable risk of regional nuclear proliferation following the JCPOA, the spread of jihadist Islam,
and Russia’s growing penetration of the region. Manifest US weakness is also bound to have ripple effects far beyond the Middle East, as global players question the value of partnership with an irresolute Washington.

Washington Disengages
From his earliest days in power, President Barack Obama has pursued a grand strategy of retrenchment based on the belief that the Bush administration’s interventionist policies had severely damaged US standing. In Obama’s view, a very different strategy was required: a
non-aggressive, multilateral, and non-interventionist approach.1

This has resulted in the erosion of US clout in several regions, notably Eastern
Europe, the Far East, and the Middle East.2

Most unambiguous was Obama’s intent to reduce the US presence in
the Middle East. The rationale for this policy shift was clear: the region
is among the world’s most volatile areas, and anti-US sentiment is
particularly fierce. US forces fought two costly wars in the region over
the past decade, in Afghanistan and in Iraq, in an attempt to prevent
those states from becoming bases of terrorism and to promote their
democratization – only to be taught a painful lesson about the limits of
power and the need for greater foreign policy realism. As Washington’s
deficiency at political engineering in the Middle East became clearer,
overseas interventions became less popular at home. This evolution in
domestic attitudes facilitated Obama’s strategic shift.

The desire for a lower profile in the Middle East was not the only
factor behind Washington’s retreat from the region. US dependence on
energy resources from the Persian Gulf has been reduced, thanks to new
technologies that can extract natural gas and oil within the continental
US. The country has, in fact, become an influential producer in the global
energy market and is heading toward energy independence. According
to a 2015 Energy Department report, even with low prices, US crude
oil production was expected to hit a new record.5 Under these new
circumstances, the Middle East appears less directly relevant to US
interests. However, in the long run, this perspective might prove shortsighted,
as the decline in energy dependency could be temporary.

The preference to downgrade US involvement in the Middle East was
reinforced by Washington’s pronounced decision to “pivot” toward
China, an emerging global challenger. While Asia has always been
important for the US, Obama emphasized that his administration would
no longer be diverted by secondary arenas such as the Middle East and
would instead elevate Asia to top priority.6

Despite such declarations, however, “pivoting to China” remains primarily a slogan with little
policy content. The hollowness of the initiative has accomplished little
other than to underscore American inaction and weakness.

As a result of this re-prioritization, the Obama administration has
reduced military assets available for projecting power in the Middle East.
For example, there have been no aircraft carriers in either the eastern
Mediterranean or the Gulf since October 2015 – an unprecedented
situation. And while officials within the Navy continue to recognize the
need for a permanent aircraft carrier presence in the Gulf or its vicinity,
the Navy is going ahead with plans for longer periods during which there
will be no carriers in the area at all. A US spokesperson has said that the
reduced presence is due not to lack of need but to the availability of fewer
carriers and the prioritization of the Asia-Pacific.7

Regional Consequence

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