Ending Sykes-Picot: Why the U.S. Should Support a Federal Syrian Republic

Gabriel Max Scheinmann, algemeiner

Thirty years ago this month, 800 U.S. Marines waded onto Beirut’s beaches tasked with facilitating the evacuation of thousands of PLO terrorists out of Lebanon in the hopes of ending a conflict that had ensnared Syria and Israel. That mission, explicitly defined and time-limited, was successful. Shortly after the last Marine left Lebanese soil, however, President Reagan ordered them back in again while more than doubling the size of the force and vastly expanding its mission. This time, U.S. forces were asked to strengthen Lebanese state institutions in order to restore a “one law, one gun” maxim.


What was once a 60-day peacekeeping deployment became a 17-month misadventure. U.S. forces clashed with Syrian troops, maintained ill-coordinated postures with Israeli forces, and were ultimately withdrawn under fire and humiliation following the bombing of a U.S. Marine barracks in the fall of 1983 by Hezbollah. It was not America’s finest hour.

As planning for a post-Assad Syria accelerates, the Obama administration is signaling its desire to keep Syrian political and military institutions intact.However, America’s own, now lengthy and bloody, history of Middle East state building suggests that doing so may be costly, unwise, and at odds with the region’s natural proclivity. Rather than uphold the illusory political order installed by the century-old Sykes-Picot Agreement, the U.S. should encourage the creation of a federal Syrian republic with far greater autonomy for its component parts.

When U.S. forces landed in Beirut in 1982, President Reagan’s primary mandate was the “restoration of a strong and stable central government.” While this would necessitate the withdrawal of PLO, Israeli, and Syrian forces as well as the disbanding of all sectarian militias, Reagan assured the American people that the U.S. had “no intention or expectation” of getting involved in hostilities and that it would withdraw immediately if fired upon. In February 1984, following repeated clashes with Syrian forces as well as the devastating twin bombings of the U.S. embassy and Marine Corps barracks that left nearly 300 U.S. servicemen dead, President Reagan ordered the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Lebanon. Thirty years later, Reagan’s objectives remain unachieved: the Lebanese central government is frail, Hezbollah is the dominant political and military force, and a multinational force continues to provide a false sense of security.

Iraq marked the second U.S. state-building venture in the Middle East. The nine-year commitment of significant U.S. blood and treasure did indeed manage to stand-up a somewhat-functioning Iraqi state, but its long-term viability is far from certain. The Iraqi constitution, a document that enshrines federalism as well as recognition of the many, non-Arab Iraqi peoples (Kurds, Assyrians, Turkmen), gives significant autonomy to Iraq’s 18 provinces as well as the three-province Kurdistan region, where the Kurdistan Regional Government has established a fully-functioning quasi-state, with its own parliamentary, diplomatic, and proto-military trappings. Similarly, over the past year, several Sunni-majority provinces have pushed for the constitutionally-guaranteed right to establish their own, self-governing region. The U.S. is once again trying to uphold a fragile order at great cost.

Enter Syria. Unified Syria, a French concoction, is crumbling under the strains of an 18-month long rebellion. While the rebel forces are dominated by the long-repressed Sunni Arab majority, other minority groups, such as the Syrian Kurds along the Turkish border, are leveraging their participation in the rebellion for greater recognition of rights and self-governance in a post-Assad Syria. Similarly, Druze, Christians, and, most understandably, Alawites fret over what a Sunni Arab-ruled would mean. Once again, however, Washington’s instincts are to uphold the status quo rather than support devolution of power and authority.

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has supported keeping all Syrian security forces together while Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has advocated a “managed transition that keeps the institutions of the Syrian state intact” in order to avoid the violent years in post-Saddam Iraq. Given America’s state-building experience with two of Syria’s neighbors, an attempt to patch together a European-inspired entity—especially without boots on the ground—is a Sisyphean task.

The Sykes-Picot era of European-created Middle East states held together by Arab nationalist strongmen is rapidly unraveling. Much like how the collapse of the Soviet Union heralded drastic changes in Europe’s political borders—ones the U.S. did not stop—the ongoing Arab revolt could also promulgate the Balkanization of the Middle East.

Rather than apply superglue to the widening cracks in Syria, as the U.S. tried to do in Lebanon and Iraq, Washington should encourage the establishment of a federal Syrian republic, enhancing the autonomy of its distinct, minority peoples, such as the Kurds and Alawites. Just as Britain and France inaugurated the Sykes-Picot order during the first great Arab Revolt of the 20th century, the U.S. can euthanize it in the first Arab Revolt of the 21st century.

Gabriel Max Scheinmann, a Visiting Fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), is a Ph.D. candidate in Government at Georgetown University, focusing on international security, alliance architecture, and grand strategy.

 

August 17, 2012 | 6 Comments »

Leave a Reply

6 Comments / 6 Comments

  1. The breakdown of existing strong central power structures anywhere, not just in the Middle East, has always led to the development of smaller feifdoms which seem historicallly to have developed along either ancient tribal or cultural affiliations. Thus, it appears that Sunni Arabs, Kurds, Alawites and Shias will all develop into largely separate political entities with perhaps some relatively weak national affiliation, at least for the time being. Unification under one national flag appears to be impossible in the near future. About the only unifying principle apparent at the present, beside tribal and cultural affiliation, is Islam and Sharia law coupled with powerful anti-Israeli (Jewish) sentiment. The development of small and by definition somewhat weaker states tends to give the larger states greater influence in the affairs of the smaller states, particularly if the larger states share tribal or cultural affiliations. Thus, Turkey, Iran, Egypt and Saudi Arabia become more influential in the region, although perhaps geographically separated from their vassals. This by it’s nature is an unstable arrangement and will lead to increased military, economic and social instability in these regions. Iran seems to gain the most by virtue of a strong Shia presence in Iraq and Lebanon, and an historical tendency, it seems, to expand toward the West. Taking into account all of this, the policy of the US and Israeli governments needs to be directed toward achieving stability and relative weakness in whatever regions, states or nations end up bordering Israel. This might best be achieved by a confederation of States, but history seems to suggest that confederation does not provide stability…only strong central federal entities seem to preserve a nation. There is the dilemma…let’s see what will be achieved. (I have left the Jews,Druze and Christians out of this analysis because they are numerically a very small percentage of the population of the entire region. Jews are almost non-existent in the Middle East outside of Israel, and the Druze seem to have held onto their small enclaves for a long time. Christians are the group most likely to be permitted visas to emigrate somewhere, a phenomenon occurring throughout the Middle East over the last 50-60 years. I view it as very unlikely that they will ever organize anywhere there with a national identity particularly in the face of the persecution heralded by the more extreme elements of Islam.)

  2. @ lionofjudah
    You must be joking or else completely insensitive. When have you ever find an Arab to be a loyal friend of a westerner? And especially in this lunatic-Islamist day. You’re still in the “dream state” which oriiginally emerged with that fool and liar Lawrence-(of Arabia)……

    To dredge up the very names “Sykes-Picot” just reminds any Arab that they once used this agreement to attempt the highjacking of Israel for Arabs. It’s still brought up, even though both men categorically denied that it meant this.

  3. Its ok when viewed as a step along the way. The same approach in Iraq has basically failed and will breakdown. For Israel it appears better to have a breakup of the areas. Perhaps the arabs are on their way to being reduced back to their original arabia, perhaps sunni iraq and syria will affiliate, along with Jordan and the gulf council states. The kurds with the kurds, etc. What about the Druse and the Christians? Israel has an interest in Syria east of the Golan and Southern Lebanon. It should extend its influence to achieve results of interest, everyone else is.

  4. The peoples of the Fertile Crescent want independence. Kurds have no interest in living under Arab rule and the same is true for the Alawites and the Druze.

    Any attempt to preserve Syria in its current form is doomed. A federal republic is now out of the question and if Assad is overthrown, the country will disintegrate like the Soviet Union did.

    No Arab strongman is able to hold it together by force. Too much blood has been spilled.

    Washington would be unwise to preserve the status quo. It has no basis in reality any more than the attempts to preserve the Soviet Union against the will of its peoples were.

    The era of Arab nationalism in the Middle East is finished.