Begin – in retrospect

By MARTIN SHERMAN, JPOST

The road to hell is paved with good intentions – Aphorism attributed to Saint Bernard of Clairvaux (1090-1153)

We cannot conclude from the good intentions of a statesman that his foreign policies will be either morally praiseworthy or politically successful….How often have statesmen been motivated by the desire to improve the world, and ended by making it worse? And how often have they sought one goal, and ended by achieving something they neither expected nor desired? – Hans Morgenthau (1904-1980), on political realism

The sweeping victory of the Islamist parties in the election in Egypt is – somewhat belatedly – beginning to concentrate minds. Israel is being forced to confront the stark possibility that in the foreseeable future, it may be left with no peace, no Sinai… and eventually, no demilitarization.

Inevitably, this unpalatable prospect will force a national reassessment of the process – and the personalities – that brought this ominous situation about, of the prudence of the decisions taken at the time and of the before the- fact predictability of its potentially perilous outcome.

Inevitably, too, this will focus attention on Menachem Begin and his role in precipitating Israel’s evacuation of the strategic expanses of the Sinai Peninsula in return for a peace treaty with Egypt, then Israel’s principle adversary.

A brief history
The deal, brokered by US president Jimmy Carter, was concluded in 1979 after two years of intense negotiation following Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s historic 1977 address to the Knesset. It was greeted with great international acclaim – except in the Arab world where it was long regarded as an act of treachery – and the award of Nobel peace prizes to the Egyptian and Israeli leaders.

The intended strategic substance of pact was mutual recognition of each state by the other, and the cessation of the state of war that had existed since the 1948 War of Independence.

Israel undertook a complete withdrawal from Sinai, held by it since the 1967 Six Day War, while Egypt agreed to the demilitarization of the peninsula. The agreement also provided for the free passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal, recognition of the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba as international waterways, and massive US economic and military to Egypt, whose military has since received almost $40 billion from Washington, allowing it to to modernize and revamp its aging Soviet equipment.

Stark asymmetry
Whichever way you slice it, the treaty was afflicted by a stark structural asymmetry in the undertakings of the contracting parties: On the one hand, Israel was called on to relinquish vast physical assets of great strategic and economic value, which could only be retrieved – if at all – by a massive outlay of blood and treasure.

In return for the receipt of these assets – plus generous US financial support – all that was demanded of Egypt was paper promises, which could be violated whenever it deemed it expedient or the profit worth the pain.

This asymmetry was perhaps most aptly articulated by Sadat himself, when in a 1980 interview with The New York Times, he remarked bluntly, “Poor Menachem… I got back… the Sinai and the Alma oil fields, and what has Menachem got? A piece of paper.”

From the outset then, the durability of the peace agreement hinged not only on Cairo’s continuing willingness to honor its commitments, but also its continuing ability to do – despite domestic opposition. This clearly applies – and applied then – not only to the Sadat regime, but to any successors who might accede to power – be it by the bullet or by the ballot.

Predictable perils
There is – and was – no need for the benefit of hindsight to grasp this pivotal feature of the agreement. It was distinctly discernible as an inherent element of the treaty from the get-go. It was always a precarious arrangement — its abrogation, whether sudden or in stages, always a plausible possibility.

Indeed, it would seem that Sadat himself was keenly conscious of the fragility of the treaty and how future Egyptian regimes may well feel unbound by its terms. In a 1975 interview he openly stated: “The effort of our generation is to return to the 1967 borders.

Afterward the next generation will carry the responsibility.”

Yet within the Israeli public discourse, any suggestion that the potential long-term strategic dangers might outweigh the undeniable short/intermediate-term benefits, were dismissed as the demented raving of extremist warmongers. Anyone who dared caution that the situation now emerging in Egypt and along our southern border, might in fact emerge, was scorned either as a deranged scaremonger or a uniformed ignoramus.

Consequently, there was no serious public discussion of how to respond to an intentional violation of the agreement, or an unintentional collapse of Cairo’s ability to uphold it. And in the absence of a clear and credible comprehension of what penalties such violations would incur, only a giant leap of faith in Arab altruism could induce the belief that these scenarios were implausible.

However, beyond the mindless malice and myopia of political debate in Israel, questions must be raised as to the judgment and foresight of the Israeli leadership that consented to forgo the tangible fruits of military victory for the ephemeral promise of political peace.

As Begin was the overwhelmingly dominant figure involved in Israel’s acquiescence to the treaty terms, it is likely such a reevaluation would, as an unintended side effect, damage his standing in the national pantheon.

‘The road to hell…’
The objective would be to enhance awareness of the non-static nature of Israel’s political environment, and to develop deeper understanding of how the nation should manage long-term risk in the dynamic instabilities of the Middle East. But more specifically – and more important – it is imperative to avoid creating similar situations of strategic danger through similar strategic misunderstandings of the dynamics in play on Israel’s other fronts with the Palestinians, the Syrians and the Jordanians.

There can, of course, be no doubt as to the totality of Begin’s commitment to Israel and to its security, or as to fever of his devotion to Zionism and its ideals. Indeed for many, he was the epitome of the leader whose absolute dedication to his country and his people was never subordinated to, or sidetracked by, the pursuit of partisan interest, private gain or personal prestige.

However, pure motives and noble intentions are no guarantee of effective statesmanship or strategic acumen.

Indeed, as Hans Morgenthau, one of the most influential figures in the study of modern international politics, remarked: “Chamberlain’s politics of appeasement were, as far as we can judge, inspired by good motives; he was probably less motivated by considerations of personal power than were many other British prime ministers, and he sought to preserve peace and to assure the happiness of all concerned. Yet his policies helped to make the Second World War inevitable, and to bring untold miseries to millions.”

While any comparison between the two men is wildly inappropriate, the bloodcurdling frenzy of the lynch mob that stormed the Israeli Embassy in Cairo in September may prove that Begin’s declaration of “No more war, no more bloodshed, peace forever” was no less premature and naïve than Neville Chamberlain’s “Peace in our time.”

Grim prospects
The three decades of non-belligerency (a more accurate word than “peace” to characterize Israeli-Egyptian relations since 1979) conferred significant benefits on Israel.

Regrettably, however, it seems unlikely that they will be permanent or that they will justify the perilous storm brewing on the horizon.

With the Sinai Peninsula swiftly descending into a lawless “no-go” region under the control of the most ruthless extremists on earth, Israel is facing an emerging lose-lose strategic predicament, which may soon force it to choose between the following unpalatable options: • Allowing Sinai to degenerate into an Afghanistan-like haven for radical jihadi organizations and savage criminal gangs; • Allowing a Muslim Brotherhood-controlled – at least indirectly – Egypt to remilitarize the area, ostensibly to reestablish law and order, and a gradual return to the status quo ante that prevailed prior to the 1979 accord; • Reasserting Israeli control over Sinai – at least partially – effectively repudiating the peace agreement.

Whichever alternative Israel opts for, it will render the peace treaty worthless, and totally devalue what until recently was considered a stroke of inspired statesmanship. More poignantly, it will render the enormous sacrifices of the 1967 and 1973 wars almost pointless, and the dangers, which so many gave their lives or limbs to avert, may well be reinstated with a vengeance.

Deep conceptual defects
But the Israel-Egypt peace treaty was defective and dysfunctional not only because events happened to turn out the way they did. It was deeply flawed on a more profound and predictable level, in terms of the political theory and the conceptions that comprised its political rationale.

These were (a) demilitarization vis-à-vis the Egyptians and (b) autonomy vis-à-vis the Palestinians.

Neither of these could be expected to endure much beyond a generation — except under the irresponsible assumption of wildly optimistic and unrealistic conditions, which clearly ought not to have been presumed to prevail.

Given the limits of space, I shall confine the discussion to demilitarization and defer the debate of the futility of autonomy for a later opportunity.

Demilitarization is a severe constraint on a nation’s sovereignty – stripping it of the freedom to deploy coercive means of its choice within designated portions of its territory, in deference to the interests/demands of some alien state(s).

As such, its continuation is dependent on the compliance of the demilitarizing party.

Indeed, as soon as it has the will and the ability to terminate it, it may well do so – as the case of the demilitarization – and later remilitarization – by Germany of the Rhineland, in violation of both the Versailles and Locarno treaties, demonstrates.

It would be – and should have been considered – a reckless gamble to assume that such a situation might not arise in Egypt – not only because, as we have seen, Sadat himself had alluded to this possibility, but because other sources warned of the danger as well.

For example, Maj.-Gen. George Keegan, a US Air Force intelligence officer, warned in a 1977 Jerusalem Post interview that “the feudal leadership in the Arab world strikingly remains committed, messianically, to the extermination of Israel as a nation and as a people,” but in the face of repeated military defeats, “they are beginning to use the strategy of the indirect approach” of diplomatic deception.

In retrospect
Almost half a decade before the Arab Spring, Daniel Pipes, in a commendably incisive analysis titled “Rethinking the Egypt- Israel ‘Peace’ Treaty,” warned: “In retrospect, it becomes apparent that multiple fallacies and wishful predictions fueled Arab-Israeli diplomacy:

    • Once signed, agreements signed by unelected Arab leaders would convince the masses to give up their ambitions to eliminate Israel.

    • These agreements would be permanent, with no backsliding, much less duplicity.

    • Other Arab states would inevitably follow suit.

    • War can be concluded through negotiations rather than by one side giving up.

“The time has come to recognize the Egypt- Israel treaty – usually portrayed as the glory and ornament of Arab-Israel diplomacy – as the failure it has been, and to draw the appropriate lessons in order not to repeat its mistakes.”

It would be perilous folly to ignore this sober warning.

Israel cannot afford the same grand “Beginesque” naiveté in its future dealings with the Syrians, with the Palestinians, and with the Jordanians. Mistakes may well be irretrievable.

December 9, 2011 | 36 Comments »

Leave a Reply

36 Comments / 36 Comments

  1. I agree with Aaron. Many of us had our doubts at the time about the peace agreement, but there really is no doubt that at least a scab formed over what had been a running sore and that lasted until now. Begin was sincere in his determination to have no truck with terrorists – witness the first Lebanon War.

  2. It has been said that Israels frame of reference in the 67 war was to the Holocaust and the 73 wars frame of reference was to the 67 war. Israeli arrogance and underestimating the enemy were mostly responsible for the debacle of 73 and the subsequent war of attrition. Both could have and should have been foreseen and countered.

    Golda Meir, fearful of the American reaction and procrastinating in the face of a Jewish holiday, did not preempt in 1973 when the Egyptian military buildup was unmistakable, though she could have deluded herself about its purpose. Compounding a grave error with a grave crime, Golda sent Jewish reservists to the slaughter, which resulted in 10,000 casualties—instead of employing nuclear weapons. Golda’s fear of world opinion greatly exceeded her concern with Jewish lives. That ugly character famously announced that she could forgive the Arabs for killing Jews, but not for making the Jews to kill Arabs. Likewise, her accomplice Moshe Dayan remarked during the early stages of the Yom Kippur war, “We’re witnessing the Third Temple’s destruction,” and reportedly was on the way to offer capitulation instead of nuking the Arabs.

    The perversion gets worse. During the Lebanon war, the leftists demanded that Israel pull out, thus wasting over 600 Jewish lives lost to combat the terror on our northern border. The right-wing Likud demanded that the IDF stay put in Beirut, opening itself to still more casualties. No mainstream politician had the guts to do what has to be done to secure Norththern Israel: depopulate South Lebanon.

    The war of attrition and the 1973 war demonstrated, rather conclusively that the Sinai was indefensible.

    I of course disagree. Faulty planning and stupid tactics based on misconceptions does not mean the Sinai was not defensible.

    They say the only ones who profited from the Bar Lev Line were the contractors who built it. (No tenders issued or awarded and they billed the government and were paid many times the normal profit margins). A stupid policy from it’s inception and I disagree with you that Israel did not have the manpower to police and protect the long line with Egypt. Sharon fought for a mobile defense and was over ruled. The cost of staying in and holding Sinai was already spent for the most part the bases and basic infrastructure already existed by the time Begin went to Camp David. The savings in the cost of energy we received and would receive from Sinai gas and oil would have supported a larger standing military force and better equipped one as well. By the end of the war of attrition we had pretty much solved the problem of the Russian SAM’s. Even the war of attrition could have been stopped at it’s inception had Israel gone after Egypt’s military and civilian infrastructures instead of slugging it out over the Canal areas. If Israel had used a tactical nuke at the beginning of the 73 war all of the rest would have been mute and I don’t think the Russians would use their nukes especially for a client like Egypt.

    Yes, it would be nice to have unlimited expanses to train in, yes it would be lovely to have almost unlimited oil and water, it would be exceptionally nice to have room for agriculture. The reality is more difficult, the nation of Israel and the IDF is simply too small to properly defend such an elongated border. In conjunction with Syria,** the Arabs very nearly succeeded in carrying out their tired old strategy of dual blows from the North and South at the same time, by using a suprise attack made possible ONLY by the IDF being spread too thinly over an immense expanse. To put it bluntly, Israel could not afford the price it very nearly paid for this extended lebensraum.

    Just the opposite it was the vastness of the Sinai that saved us from being overrun, despite the mistakes and unpreparedness of the IDF, Sinai gave us time to fully mobilize and counterattack. What was true then goes double and triple today.

    * Without the well publicized sea/airlift of material, the IDF would have been beyond its breaking point.

    The Russians in on the Arab plans from the start had their supply airlift in place from day one of the war. By the time the first American plane landed at Lod we had the third arm
    y surrounded and cut off and were on the other side of the Canal with an open road all the way to Cairo. Essentially by then the war was over. The resupply especially aircraft was useful after the war but had no part in winning the war. We had captured all the equipment, hardware and ammo the Egyptians were using on the front and were not short of anything. It really pisses me off to keep reading this urban myth repeated so often.

    ** You make too much of the apparent docility of Syria without a treaty binding them not to act. Syria learned in multiple wars that even with the element of suprise, it cannot hope to succeed in fighting Israel alone. While Egypt refuses to act in concert with Syria, Syria cannot act effectively.

    Works for me. I could live without a peace treaty with Syria. They have nothing of value we want or need.

  3. Ok, I’m sorry yamit82, I misread your argument (I’d say in my defence that I didn’t have the opportunity to read it fully developed, but as you say about bucks stopping).

    Yes, Israel had spent billions on developing the Sinai. Israel had invested not just money, but also several decades of experience in making deserts productive and a paying proposition and of course, there is also the argument that the Sinai was a natural buffer to Egyptian militarism.

    The war of attrition and the 1973 war demonstrated, rather conclusively that the Sinai was indefensible. Israel lacked the sheer manpower and the weight of armour necessary to successfully defend that enormous expanse, bordered by a large river crossing (it may be different today, depends on how many drones the IDF is willing to lose on a day to day basis). The IDF learned, at great cost (the Bar Lev Line is a classic example), the essential truth of Frederick II (the Great) of Prussia’s axiom, that “he who defends everywhere defends nothing.” The defensive line was stretched too thin, the Egyptians utilized their absolute control of their airspace (due to the war of attrition) to concentrate and prepare in great secrecy. As a consequence Israel very nearly lost not only the Sinai and the Suez Canal, but the war itself.

    The size of the IDF makes it impossible to adequately patrol or defend such expanses, while the need to try and cut off the enemy advance at its narrowest point before the Sinai widens out, meant that heavily armoured columns were sent enormous distances (completely negating the concept underlying the construction of the Bar Lev Line in the first place). But the clincher was the ATGM and its effect upon armoured counter-attack (a mainstay of the IDF’s offensive culture) and the SAM which made surprise possible in the first place and which caused immense losses to the IAF operating against the Egyptian Armoured Columns. The losses suffered in equipment, lives and weapons were enough to bring the IDF almost* to breaking point.

    Yes, it would be nice to have unlimited expanses to train in, yes it would be lovely to have almost unlimited oil and water, it would be exceptionally nice to have room for agriculture. The reality is more difficult, the nation of Israel and the IDF is simply too small to properly defend such an elongated border. In conjunction with Syria,** the Arabs very nearly succeeded in carrying out their tired old strategy of dual blows from the North and South at the same time, by using a suprise attack made possible ONLY by the IDF being spread too thinly over an immense expanse. To put it bluntly, Israel could not afford the price it very nearly paid for this extended lebensraum. If Begin viewed the events leading up to this incredible clusterf*k differently to the rest of Likud, then at least he had the moral integrity to stand for what he believed in, which was the safety of the Country. The fact that the voters disregarded the very real danger posed, or didn’t value it highly enough, does not make them right (yes Israel won, but it was touch and go and due to luck in almost as big a degree as judgment). While the voters might have been prepared to take the risk in exchange for prosperity, it would be a poor statesman (but a consumate politician) who took such a risk lightly.

    * Without the well publicized sea/airlift of material, the IDF would have been beyond its breaking point.

    ** You make too much of the apparent docility of Syria without a treaty binding them not to act. Syria learned in multiple wars that even with the element of suprise, it cannot hope to succeed in fighting Israel alone. While Egypt refuses to act in concert with Syria, Syria cannot act effectively.

  4. The dumbest thing he did was believing that successive Israeli leaders would understand the difference between enforceable and unenforceable obligations under a contract. When they are unenforceable, lawyers tend to allow any half-baked shit to be included when leaving them out would cruel a good deal. Unfortunately, the world disagrees (it would be nice to see the Arabs forced by public opinion to uphold even one promise they make, enforceable or otherwise).

    The effectiveness of the deal is deeper than what is written. The Egyptian General Staff were (and I believe are) fully aware that their continued power (and existence) is dependent upon maintaining their weapons systems. While they might huff and puff, when it comes down to it, without continued spares and replacement systems, their weapons are worthless (and they’d go the same way as the Generals of the Shah). Regardless of what the “new” set of crooks that end up in power think, Allah is not going to provide spare parts, refurbishment or overhauls and deserts are hell on heavy equipment.

    The deal, sweet though it looked to Sadat & Co, is a poisoned chalice. Yes, they got the latest and greatest toys on the market, but that left them dependent upon the continued goodwill of the Americans in order to maintain their arsenal. Crossing a decent size desert at any speed requires an awful lot of spare parts, is hell on machinery, and requires an incredible amount of supporting equipment. If the Generals are shortsighted enough to try it, they can at best hope to win before they lose their heads to the mob.

  5. For the moment, things are building to a head all over the world with arabs. Maybe they are cold blooded and need warm climates to act like goons? Or is it that they are scared of fat Maories (plenty are, they too tend to operate in gangs)?

  6. yamit82 says:
    December 12, 2011 at 12:02 pm

    If the primary purpose of Israel is Peace then I suggest moving to New Zealand

    Look out, Teshuvah, here I come!

  7. In terms of promises, non-core promises and the like, it is one of the larger rubber stamp jobs, I’d agree.

    But it achieved a cease-fire (which is better terminology, given that monitors are on the border still and have been since the deal was signed). That is the important point.

    Egypt had been knocked on its ass and basically busted three times before, they’d lost most of the equipment supplied to them by the Russians and the British in 1948, they lost most of the equipment supplied to them by the Russians in 1956, and they’d done so again in 1967. It did not prevent them coming back for another go. In fact the attrition suffered prior to 1973, coupled with 1973 war, very nearly succeeded. There is absolutely no reason to believe that the Russians would have refused to supply more weapons (they’d moaned in the past, but they still came through – the intelligence gleaned from testing the effectiveness of the Sagger and the SAM systems more than paid for the weapons themselves).

    To suggest otherwise is to accept a revisionist view of history. Russia lost more weapons quite regularly throughout that period of history, in the Vietnam war, in its own war with China, and the losses while serious, were in a good cause (in that they reduced the capacity of the US to field an effective army in Europe) and allowed for combat proving of new weapons systems. The Warsaw Pact, was, in the 1970’s at the peak of its capabilities and the wastage of weapons in the 1973 war was miniscule in comparison to the amounts being fielded (and sold to Arab Countries).

    Without Begin and Camp David, there would have been no ceasefire. The actions of various suppliers after 1948, 1956, 1967 make this very clear. Regardless of what Arab leaders may state in revisionist histories, which tend to apologise for their own errors and attempt to magnify perceived errors on the behalf of others, Egypt was as busted militarily after 1973 and as primed for a 30 year ceasefire as Syria was (you’ll have the grace I hope to agree that the USSR wasted little time resupplying them?). Their losses in material and lives were comparable after all.

  8. The quietest border Israel has is still with Syria and without a formal agreement. Syria supports Hezbollah and Egypt supports Hamas with an agreement. Having Israeli artillery on the Golan zeroed in on all of Damascus ensures that peaceful border. I can live without eating Humus in Damascus or visiting the Casbah in Damascus, not sure how long I could live without the Golan?

    If the primary purpose of Israel is Peace then I suggest moving to New Zealand or Boston, Israelis and Jews can live peacefully with Arabs in those venues.

  9. Never chose a Lawyer as head of State or any serious commercial enterprise. Begin believed in contract law. Too bad the world doesn’t unless it relates to an Israeli obligation. Who cares after the fact what the details of any agreements are?

    Stupid Begin Believed in American guarantees and caved into the demands and pressure of the weakest President America has ever produced possibly including the current president.

  10. That is not part of the agreement, but a framework. Which is best demonstrated by the fact that nobody made any attempt to demand it be given effect or to give it effect. It is fluff and essentially meaningless, or it was until a truly shortsighted fool decided to give it effect. I would submit that Begin is not and was not to blame for the criminal stupidity of later leaders.

  11. yamit82, but what has the left done? Have they bought even one minute of peace?

    I have a longish comment in moderation and if Ted releases it will put more meat to the bone of my contentions.

    We never had a peace with Egypt but a sort of cease fire. Egypt was and remains or most virulent opponent in the Arab world. They have used those 30 years to build up their military capabilities, on paper equal or exceeding Israels and have constantly used every forum to attack Israel and reduce our own capabilities, including the support for most of these years for Hamas and other Pali terrorists.

    The Israeli left at that time would never have agreed to what Begin did, and if they had tried the Israeli right then a majority with the steadfast Mapai loyalists especially from the Kibbutzim would have blocked it.. That’s the political paradox we have here.

    I attended the Labor party meeting called to vote on how Labor would vote in the Knesset. After a heated debate where labor was split A small majority was against the agreements. Peres closed the debate when he said they have either two choices to vote yes or no and there was no room for counter suggestions or amendments. He said Begin had boxed them into a corner with no room for any modifications, up or down vote is their only option. A small majority voted for the agreements in this forum and if a majority of the Likud had voted no it would never have passed with the strong negative votes by labor.

    The vote for or against was called for only a week after the accords were singed and the ratification by the Knesset became a rubber stamp. No real public debate no serious assessments as to the negative or potential negatives. All the organs of the State and the media were pressed into the service of selling the agreements and obfuscating the dangers and negatives. The people were lied to and not given time to reflect and this is largely true to this day.

  12. aaron1975 says:
    December 12, 2011 at 10:33 am

    It states that Jordan, Egypt and Israel will arrange how things work, not the Palestinians, thus no non-State actors.

    “…they have eyes but do not see…” – Pslams 135:16

    Quote from the very tippy top of Subsection A:

    A. West Bank and Gaza

    1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects.

    You may also note that the text of that subsection is missing from the agreement, thus it is ancillary thereto and not required for the purpose of the agreement.

    I note that it is signed by all parties, just the same as the latter section is signed by all parties.

    In any case, it was historically carried out. Unfortunately for Israel’s shortsightedness, they didn’t realize that any Arabs attempting to be “representatives of the Palestinian people” were bumped off by the PLO. This went on until…. [fill in the rest yourself, for it explains exactly how we got to Oslo and to worse today]

  13. Begin did buy Israel 30 years of peace, at least with regard to the most dangerous of all her adversaries, Egypt. Immediately in the wake of 1973, that is no small victory.

    The hell it did, I maintain without the Camp David Accords there still would have been peace with a permanently weakened Egypt. They were broke, a fast growing population, Israel had captured most of the Russian supplied weapons in 73 and the Russians were not so forthcoming in the replacements, so Sadat had kicked them out and Egypt had no big power support. The Russians blamed Egypt for losing the war and wasting their Russian weapons. It cost Russia billions in sales to other countries in favor of American arms as other countries faulted the Russian weapons no less than the Egyptian and Syrian military capabilities in the field. The Russians did not resupply fully Egyptian losses and placed greater demands on Egypt, than what Egypt was prepared to accede to.

    Sadat, according to his wife and close confidants was surprised that Israel offered and agreed to leave all of Sinai and was said to have been prepared to accept far less. He needed the agreement more than Israel. America for Russia was the aim not Peace with Israel. Israel allowed the Americans in and that was the major mistake. I said it then and have been vindicated now.

  14. Begin was not sweet talked into anything. He was a phony ideologue, a demagogue who could never live up to his rhetoric. He was a weak character who sold Israel and the Jewish people out for the applause of the international community and the newly found love of the left who had maligned him during his whole adult life. When it counted he folded and showed that personal aggrandizement was more important to him than doing what was right according to all his speeches and behavior prior to becoming PM. Some attribute his behavior to depression, maybe, but if so he should have resigned.

    It sill pains me to hear likudniks praise Begin for Camp David Accords and I could never in good conscience support such a perfidious party that not only betrayed all of it’s ideological principles but still brags about them as something positive. BB more than most.

  15. Yes, I’ve looked, I don’t see what you are referring to, or (if you are referring to what I think) why you think it is in any way comparable to the stupidity of Oslo (or other venues).

    It states that Jordan, Egypt and Israel will arrange how things work, not the Palestinians, thus no non-State actors. You may also note that the text of that subsection is missing from the agreement, thus it is ancillary thereto and not required for the purpose of the agreement. It is nothing more, or less, than a preamble, something that is suggested “might” happen sometime between the date on which the agreement is signed and the day hell freezes over. If the subsection was to be given effect it would have been included in the treaty itself, not the preamble. I’d strongly suggest that that subsection is one of the things Sadat wanted included in the actual treaty (his wishlist), but Begin was not prepared to concede and which Sadat having gained so much was not prepared to let spoil the outcome (quite probably the inability to enforce that subsection was the reason for Sadat’s demise).

    To put it very plainly, it would be like stating in the ‘framework’ to purchasing a new car that you and the car dealer will work together to ensure that the warranty is not invalidated and that you get what you want. Nice thought(s), but not part of the deal, which is dealt with in the agreement (contract) below. The world is full of wish lists and nice thoughts, they don’t pay the bills.

  16. If I could name the worst (all of them have been bad) PM Israel ever had from the results of there decisions and actions while PM, Begin is a slam dunk.
    A- After 33 years in the Israeli political wilderness and finally reaching the pinnacle of Israeli political power Begin betrays his own constituency , party loyalists and appoints Moshe Dayan then in the political wilderness after the 73 war and the war of attrition to be Foreign Minister and Weizmann an unstable Labor leaning political wannabe to be Defense Minister. Dayan and Weizmann were brothers in law and there was a similarity in their world views. By this time Israel had already fought and captured all or part of Sinai 4 times since 48 and had invested billions in civilian and military infrastructure in the Sinai, 2 major urban towns and tens of agricultural settlements that were then producing by 72′ 80% of the tomatoes and flowers in Israel and were exporting hundreds of millions of foreign exchange for the country. We had built a huge agricultural hot house on sand dunes and glass houses.
    B- Israel had discovered large sources of gas and oil that would have made in a few years Israel energy independent. works out to about 2-3 billion dollars per year in today’s dollar value of oil and gas. The export potential from Sinai gas and oil was comparable to Iran if developed.
    C- Sinai tourist potential would have made Israel one of the leading tourist sites in the world.
    D- There was no major populations of indigenous populations to deal with except Gaza and El Arish.
    E- Israeli hydrologist had discovered and underground lake deep under the sinai sands that was reported large enough to supply all Of Israel fresh water for at least 100 years based on our population of 1973.
    F-Israel had built two of the most sophisticated air bases in the world in Sinai which would have brought Israel closer today to all of our enemies by almost 500 miles and the Sinai provided the IAF with the air space to train which we don’t have today.
    G Israel presence in the Sinai guaranteed that the Suez Canal would remain open or closed based on Israeli actions no less than Egypts. That alone would have afforded Israel a greater strategic value to the west than what developed after we evacuated Sinai.
    H- Pundits forget that Egypt before Camp David had thrown the Russians out and had no big power backer. The Saudis were not paying their promised stipend of 1-2 billion a year to Egypt and the economy of Egypt was in a dire fix with bread riots after they raised the price of basic stapes only a few cents.
    The dismantlement of permanent settlements in Sinai established the diplomatic precedent for all future withdrawals and settlements of Jews destroyed and Jews ethnically cleansed. The Oslo Accords were the direct result of the Camp David Accords and the demand of the Americans Europeans and the rest of the worlds current demands of ethnically cleansing of Jews from the rest of the disputed liberated lands Israel had acquired in defensive wars.
    Begin is solely responsible for all of the above. The left loved him the ideological right considered him in all things a traitor who betrayed every principle of Jabotynsky, made a mockery of everything he stood for in his adult life, for the applause of the left, the media and the international community. He was classically a demagogue that when it counted became the Israeli equivalent of the Emperor’s New Clothes.

    Begin displayed his own moral cowardice when after concluding the Camp David Accords kept the Jewish settler residents of Sinai virtual prisoners for almost three years by refusing to come to financial terms with the settlers until all of the conditions of the agreement with Egypt had been fulfilled, refused to come to Yamit to speak personally with the residents whose lives he destroyed and refused to meet any representative of Yamit after Camp David. Many believe with good evidence the the ist Lebanon war was pursued to distract public opinion from the perfidy and weakness of Begin and his government.

    The cost to Israel of the Sinai evacuation resulted in hyperinflation that reached it’s peak of 23% in a single month and had reached almost 450% in a single year. Israel lost over 10 years of economic growth due to the evacuation of Sinai.

    As I mentioned above Sadat had thrown the Russians out and had no big power backer certainly no one to give them billions in free weapons. Begin by his utter lack of vision and stupidity allowed America to replace the Russians with 2 billion per year $500 million in direct non military aid, American training and the same weapons sold and given to Israel. That forced Israel to spend at least 50% more of our limited resources in order to maintain parity with Egypt and all the other Arab nations bordering and threatening Israel. It is doubtful Egypt would today be any major threat to us without the American involvement. In fact peace might have prevailed without the American interference.

    Israel never actualized a peace dividend with Egypt they were always antagonistic towards us and did what they could to avoid fulfilling the cooperative annexes to Camp David not to mention their overt support for the Palis and especially Hamas.

    Historically Egypt’s claim to Sinai goes back to 1922 when the British gave the Sinai to Egypt. The Arab citizens of Sinai under Egyptian rule were not given Egyptian citizenship and the rule of law was Egyptian military law similar to Israels administration of the West Bank and Gaza. Sinai before 73 did not appear on any map of Egypt as being part of Egypt proper. After 5 wars over Sinai Israel winning 5 wars there is no moral, historical or political precedent for returning same territory to the aggressor nation who lost every conflict over the same territory. The spoils of war certainly have the greater wait of precedent and basic logic.

    The claim that it bought us 30 years of peace is a specious argument, we have not had a shooting war with Egypt but we have laid the ground work for a war with a strengthened Egypt possibly a nuclear agressive enemy Egyptin the near future and because of the precedent we have been saddled with the concept of Land for peace and the eventual push back of Israel to the 1966 armistice lines that can’t be defended.

    of course Begin was not the only guilty party but as PM as Truman said “the buck stops here”. Begin could never match his deeds to his Rhetoric.

  17. I suggest you are mixing up two fundamentally different types of negotiation.

    The deal with Sadat, was negotiated peace, from a position of strength. Despite the asymmetry of the relationship, the vast size of Egypt, their apparent military might and all the rest, they had just taken their best shot and been categorically and emphatically beaten in the field. Yes, Egypt received quite a lot in return for negotiation, Israel had quite a lot of Egypt’s land to negotiate with after all. What could Israel use to bargain with? Lives mean next to nothing to the Egyptians, land and ‘face’ mean everything. Thus in order to reach consensus ad idem, Begin had to offer Egypt a “win” at the negotiating table that they were incapable of achieving in the field, in order to gain 30 years of breathing space for Israel (to whom lives mean more than vast tracts of useless desert). There is honour in such a compromise, between two nations, coming as a result of a dramatic defeat of the immense by the small.

    That is not to be confused with negotiating with the PLO as if they were a nation state, effectively elevating them to that position, in order to garner votes through cowardice. There is no honour in empowering psychopathic lunatics or in giving effect to their delusions of grandeur. There is only danger, danger that those same lunatics, will, having been given an inch, take the proverbial mile. That they will, far from being remotely satisfied with having achieved more through negotiation than they ever could on the field of battle, or even have dreamed of doing if they were vastly more capable than they are, would continue their now “victorious crusade” until they get more and more and more. There was danger that other, equally psychopathic lunatics (if not more so) would see the achievements of these clowns and proclaim their own crusade. The main danger was the potential rise of non-State actors, who have very little inherent power, as they do not represent the people they use as human shields, through negotiation with the same.

    Begin did not negotiate with terrorists or non-State actors. It is difficult to imagine that he would have considered doing so, of all the Statesman in the world at the time, he may have known best just how dangerous that would be. The potential to skew reality, in the mind of the non-State actors (and their supporters), to paint them as more important than they are, and to empower them to act like rogue governments (they are rogue groups, they could never effectively govern by themselves) without more – some could argue the same for Etzel, until they accepted Democratic Government and transformed to Likud. Half-assed meddling in the process has left the Government of Lebanon incapable of exercising sovereignty, it has left the territories in the hands of murderous psychopaths, and has not resulted in an hour of peace. As such it is wrong to compare, or even confuse, Begins’ approach to diplomacy, reasoned, based upon centuries of diplomatic precedent, entered from a position of strength and which achieved a long-lasting peace (almost half the life of Israel to date, compare that to 4 major wars in the preceding 30 years), with the experimental stupidity undertaken by others (with no precedent, no regard for evidence, with non-State actors and from a position of weakness).

  18. I was referring to Begin, not to you.

    Begin set the precedent, which killed 100s of his countrymen, wounded 1000s and continued for decades to reign terror and now rockets down upon this country.

    I appreciate Begin for the way he defiantly showed his Jewishness, up until he was sweet-talked by Carter and Sadat into this farce of a relationship.

  19. Shy Guy, you seem to want to make a point, but have descended into mild insult instead. If you have something to say, be a man and spit it out.
    Begin did get something for returning the Sinai to Egypt (its undisputed owner): 30 years cold peace with Egypt, defacto peace with Jordan and no war with Syria. It’s not Begins fault that liberals have wasted much of this ‘peace dividend’ trying to make a deal with the Islamofacist maniacs who only want to kill us.

  20. Tony Jacobs says:
    December 11, 2011 at 1:31 pm

    Begin didn’t give away the Sinai, he gave it back.

    OK. Dumb and dumber.

  21. Aaron Small said: “Begin did buy Israel 30 years of peace, at least with regard to the most dangerous of all her adversaries, Egypt.”
    Only a prophet could have done better.

  22. Again, I can’t find a place to post things that seem to be of immediate importance. Yes, Begin gave away Sinai to Egypt — long ago. Today, the world is faced with the IMMEDIATE need to stop the Iranians from acquiring nuclear weapons. The Saudis have not hidden the fact that if either Israel or the US does not take those weapons out of business in a timely manner, the Middle East will have at least three ADDITIONAL nuclear powers: Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey. History will find both George Bush and Barack Obama responsible for letting this happen; and if Israel doesn’t act, the late State of Israel will share in the blame. That is a patently obvious, dispassionate, even atheist observation of the facts.

    What a stupid world we live in! Am Yisrael chai!

  23. I understand that Egypt is proposing a bridge from Sinai to Saudi Arabia. Other Saudi news:

    Saudi Arabia may obtain nuclear weapons. This comes in a high-profile statement earlier this week by the former chief of the Saudi Intelligence Service, Prince Turki Al-Faisal. This is by no means the first time that a member of the ruling dynasty has hinted on the kingdom’s plans to obtain nuclear technologies.

    Prince Turki Al-Faisal warned that the following two factors could prompt Saudi Arabia to set up its own deterrent forces, – Israel’s likely nuclear arsenal and the probability that Iran will develop a nuclear weapon. The Saudi Prince said the probability of Tehran’s joining the nuclear club was the main threat…

    “Saudi Arabia hasn’t got the required infrastructure, Vladimir Yevseev says. But since it boasts huge financial resources, it will start looking for a country that could make the bomb. One option is Egypt, because Cairo does have this kind of infrastructure. Ankara is closely following Riyadh’s moves, so if the Saudis opt for developing their nuclear arms, Turkey may well follow suit.”

    http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/12/10/61969828.html

  24. Begin did buy Israel 30 years of peace, at least with regard to the most dangerous of all her adversaries, Egypt. Immediately in the wake of 1973, that is no small victory. Yes, there always were flaws – deep, dangerous ones at that, that is the nature of the problem. If such compromises hadn’t been accepted, Israel faced the stark reality of a post-Vietnam ally, unwilling to supply aid in conjunction with a pre-Afghanistan USSR, willing to supply Egypt. The situation was, given the stark realities of the 1973 conflict, grim at best.

    The road to hell may indeed be paved with good intentions, but the pitfalls and traps that lead directly there are imposed by the compromises made in the construction thereof. In this case, the road to peace was the result of immense pressure from the US Government and a threat to withhold vital aid (made even more vital by the demonstrated need for massive resupply operations during the conflict). Israel had just won her biggest fight, but was cruelly weakened in the process. Egypt had significantly higher casualties, but also had an almost unlimited supply of both cannon fodder and new equipment if they could muster the willpower to utilize them.