Illustration by Daniel Ackerman/FDD
Foreword
The threat of a nuclear-armed Iran remains the defining security challenge of our time. In “Iran’s Nuclear Disarmament: The Only Deal That Protects U.S. and Allied Security,” Orde Kittrie, Andrea Stricker, and Behnam Ben Taleblu outline a strategy to achieve the permanent dismantlement of Tehran’s nuclear weapons enterprise. Drawing from historical precedents and lessons learned from the deeply flawed nuclear deal with Iran in 2015 and leveraging today’s rare opportunity to force a weakened Iran into nuclear submission, this report presents a comprehensive road map for ensuring that the Islamic Republic is never allowed to cross the nuclear weapon threshold.
This report rejects the incrementalism of past approaches, including the 2015 nuclear deal, which provided temporary restrictions while allowing Iran to retain the infrastructure needed for a rapid nuclear breakout. As Kittrie, Stricker, and Taleblu argue, any agreement must go far beyond arms control to the complete and verifiable dismantlement of Iran’s uranium enrichment and plutonium production capabilities, its nuclear weaponization efforts, and its ballistic missile program. Transparency and accountability, verified through robust oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), with anywhere, anytime access to Iran’s nuclear and relevant military sites, must be the cornerstone of such a deal.
The urgency of this framework is made clear by Iran’s current nuclear status. With sufficient highly enriched uranium (HEU) to produce multiple nuclear weapons within months, Tehran is closer than ever to becoming a nuclear-armed state. Most of this nuclear expansion did not occur during the remainder of President Donald Trump’s first term following his May 2018 withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal. It occurred after the January 2021 inauguration of President Joe Biden who abandoned Trump’s maximum pressure campaign. The clear lesson: The Islamic Republic will escalate when it senses American weakness; it will back down when it perceives American strength.
The regime’s ambitions to develop a nuclear arsenal represent a profound threat to regional and global security. This report makes clear that anything less than wholesale dismantlement would leave the Islamic Republic with the tools to advance its nuclear and missile programs. Kittrie, Stricker, and Taleblu also wisely emphasize that the risks posed by Iran’s nuclear program cannot be separated from the regime’s broader revolutionary ideology and destabilizing foreign policy. Iran’s ballistic missile development, its history of exporting terrorism, and its efforts to subvert peace in the region demand an agreement that addresses these interconnected threats.
Negotiating with Tehran creates the risk that its theocratic regime will stall for time while advancing its nuclear program. The Islamic Republic is a master at rope-a-doping American presidents, delaying, offering reversible concessions, and heading off U.S. power. Previous administrations have even rewarded Iran with sanctions relief simply for staying at the negotiating table. Thus, any reduction in pressure on the Islamic Republic should occur only if Iran agrees to permanently and verifiably dismantle all of its potential pathways to, and capabilities for, developing nuclear weapons.
The report outlines an approach blending diplomatic, economic, and military tools to leave Tehran with no viable alternative but to comply. Restoring UN Security Council sanctions, applying maximum economic pressure, and maintaining a credible military deterrent — American and Israeli — are key components of this strategy. Sanctions must be true economic warfare — targeting Iran’s primary sources of revenue, including its oil and petrochemical exports, and enforced with an intensity that punishes circumvention by any actor whether or not they are U.S. allies. Irregular warfare operations, such as cyberattacks and sabotage, will play a critical role in exposing Iran’s vulnerabilities and degrading its nuclear and military capabilities. The Trump administration must provide Israel with the materiel support that Jerusalem needs to destroy Iran’s nuclear and economic assets and those of its leaders. If Tehran understands that Israel has both the will and the capabilities to put the regime at risk, this will bolster American coercion and sharpen the choice for Tehran.
This report is more than just a policy paper — it is a call to action.
I have spent decades confronting the Iranian threat. The regime sanctioned and threatened FDD, my colleagues, and me. I have watched in recent months as Israel, a tiny country of 10 million people with a small army, air force, and intelligence apparatus, has severely weakened Iran’s axis of proxies, destroyed most of its long-range strategic air defenses, and dramatically reduced its ballistic missile production capabilities. There is now no better time for an American president to demand the deal outlined below or, failing that, to use military force against regime assets. This report offers a clear and actionable road map for policymakers, diplomats, and security experts. It outlines the steps necessary to secure not just a temporary reprieve but a lasting solution that ensures that one of the world’s most dangerous regimes never acquires the world’s most dangerous weapon.
Mark Dubowitz
CEO, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
March 2025
Introduction
President Donald Trump has repeatedly expressed his desire for a negotiated agreement with Iran.1 On February 4, 2025, he signed a presidential memorandum that restored maximum pressure sanctions against Tehran and that declared, “[i]t is the policy of the United States that Iran be denied a nuclear weapon.”2 The following day, Trump posted, “I would much prefer a Verified Peace Agreement, which will let Iran peacefully grow and prosper.”3 In a subsequent interview, the president said of Iran’s nuclear quest, “There’s two ways of stopping them. With bombs, or with a written piece of paper.”4 Trump reiterated this choice soon after, indicating, “I’d much rather see a deal with Iran where we can do a deal — supervise, check it, inspect it and then blow it up or just make sure that there [are] no more nuclear facilities.”5
It therefore appears that the administration plans to use coercive means (what Trump’s memorandum refers to as “maximum pressure”) to obtain a negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, employing a credible threat of military force to strengthen its negotiation position. This is a sound strategy, but the specific contours of an agreement matter tremendously. Any reduction of pressure on the Islamic Republic must only occur as part of a deal in which Iran agrees to a full, permanent, and verifiable cutting off of all its potential pathways to nuclear weapons.
In particular, the administration must avoid an agreement replicating the flaws of the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).6 Since the JCPOA’s restrictions had preset expiration dates, or “sunsets,” it failed to permanently block Iran’s pathways to nuclear weapons. Nor did the deal ensure that Tehran’s covert nuclear weapons research program had ended. It also did not include “anytime, anywhere” inspections to verify Iran’s compliance. Moreover, the JCPOA did not address Iran’s growing ballistic missile arsenal, which the regime could use to deliver nuclear weapons.
Trump exited the JCPOA in May 2018. His successor, President Joe Biden, subsequently sought to revive it. While Biden attempted to negotiate, Iran massively expanded its nuclear program, arriving at the threshold nuclear weapons status it has reached today.
Rather than aim for a freeze or JCPOA-style modest rollback of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, the administration should press for the full, permanent, and verifiable nuclear disarmament of the Islamic Republic. This is an admittedly high bar, but it is the only agreement currently worth seeking with Tehran. Moreover, there are several past examples of countries agreeing to completely dismantle illicit nuclear weapons programs. Four countries peacefully rid themselves of complete, functioning nuclear weapons arsenals, and at least two additional countries peacefully dismantled their own significant nuclear weapons programs before they had achieved functioning nuclear bombs.7 While circumstances for each case differ, dismantlement is not outside the realm of possibility.
An agreement with Iran must ensure an end to nuclear fuel production, weaponization — that is, technical work on the steps needed to assemble a nuclear device — and development of nuclear-capable delivery systems. Iran must permit full access by the UN nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, to verify all steps. Notably, the U.S. Congress has already formalized the requirement that Iran verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs in return for sanctions relief.8
Trump should agree to enter into negotiations with Iran only if Tehran agrees at the outset, and takes actions on the ground to prove, that an agreement will achieve all those objectives. Trump’s negotiating team will also need to carefully determine the timing of entry into force of deal provisions and whether certain elements must be implemented as preconditions. In the past, Tehran has secured concessions, including sanctions relief, simply for consenting to nuclear negotiations. It has used negotiations to mitigate U.S. and international pressure while bolstering its nuclear program and making irreversible knowledge-based and technical gains. The Trump administration should not fall for this. Nor should it accept a negotiation process or deal that leaves Iran with its nuclear infrastructure intact to simply wait out the Trump administration and resume its nuclear threats and extortion once he leaves office.
To achieve Iran’s full and permanent nuclear dismantlement, Trump will need to impose maximum economic pressure on Tehran and underscore that the United States will, if necessary, use force to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Trump may also need to make clear that unless the regime promptly dismantles its nuclear program, Washington will move to explore other policy options against Tehran, to include assuring the success of the Iranian people’s goal of replacing the theocratic regime.9
There are only two ways Iran does not get nuclear weapons.
1) Israel and/or the US totally destroy their nuclear facilities – 100%
2) The crooked, fraudulent Muslim regime is eliminated and Iran returns to the fold of modern nations and their oppressed people are freed from the mess that France and Jimmy Carter cooked up.
Anything else is just words.