By: Gamal Abuel Hassan for Al-Monitor. April 4, 2013
For a long time, Egypt has vehemently resisted any people-to-people type of relations with Israel, and the relationship has primarily been based on security commitments and arrangements. During the final years of Mubarak’s rein, the collaboration between the Egyptian and Israeli intelligence services reached unprecedented levels. The Israeli unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 brought the two countries closer together in the face of a threat of unleashed Islamists emanating from the Gaza Strip.
After the Egyptian Revolution in January 2011, both the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces in Cairo and the Likud government led by Netanyahu in Israel managed to protect (or safeguard) the fundamentals of the Egyptian-Israeli relationship, as they kept the treaty and security commitments it entailed quite intact. Both parties shared an interest not to rock the boat during the delicate transitional period in Egypt.
Although Netanyahu was probably one of the first leaders to use the term “Islamic winter” when referring to the “Arab Spring,” he was adept enough to contain potentially serious crises with Egypt, such as the cross-border attacks in Eilat in August 2011 and the storming of the Israeli Embassy in Cairo by an angry mob in Sept. of the same year. As a matter of fact, relations with Egypt after the revolution were managed in the least partisan way. Egypt was deemed a top security issue that transcended petty politics. It is one of the rare cases where Kissinger’s famous saying about Israel not having a foreign policy, only a domestic one, was proved wrong.
In reality, nothing has changed since Mubarak stepped down in terms of the fundamentals of the Egyptian-Israeli relationship. Gaza is still, in effect, under siege, and the peace treaty remains in place. Abolishing the treaty, or amending it, does not even seem to be on the Muslim Brotherhood’s agenda.
Facing immense expectations to deliver at home, Morsi was in no shape to challenge the order of things in the Middle East. The security triangle — Egypt-Israel-United States — came to manifest itself as a very powerful strategic reality. Hard to overlook and almost impossible to challenge. The dependence of the Egyptian army on the annual US military aid ($1.3 billion in 2012) and the Brotherhood’s need for US political support were both crucial factors that influenced Morsi’s calculations. More importantly, he came to realize that the relationship between Egypt and Israel is largely sustained through security channels.
In no other incident was this realization on the part of Morsi more evident than it was during the brief round of clashes between Israel and Hamas in Nov. 2012. This was the first foreign policy test to the newly elected Muslim Brotherhood leader. Conscious of the limitations and aware of the risks, he had no choice but to employ the old strategy, devised and successfully applied by the late Omar Suleiman (the former head of Egyptian intelligence services under Mubarak), of mediating a cease-fire between Israel and Hamas.
During the November crisis, Morsi came to realize that the “Israeli connection” might even be a political asset. Yearning to be internationally embraced, a crisis between Hamas and Israel was exactly what the Brotherhood leader needed in order to present his credentials to the west as a moderate and trustworthy player. Not unlike Mubarak, he perceived his role as a mediator between Israel and Hamas. The strong ideological, and presumably organizational, affiliations between the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas did not prevent Morsi from playing that role; actually they made his job much easier than Suleiman’s, who was not quite trusted by Hamas.
To bring about a new lull, Morsi had to depend entirely on the same Suleiman team in the Egyptian intelligence services that shared long-standing relations, of years of mutual trust, with their Israeli counterparts. In so doing, he was giving their role in managing the complex relationship with Israel a stamp of approval.
The Egyptian security establishment has been very much inclined to see Hamas as a national security threat, particularly since its takeover of Gaza in 2007.
This view stems from the fear that Israel is trying to “wash its hands off Gaza” and to push it in Egypt’s direction. For the Egyptian security mind, this would be the worst nightmare ever. Egyptian officials are also worried that Islamist groups in Gaza might be responsible for the deteriorating security situation in Sinai, which has witnessed numerous terrorist attacks since 2003.
Although the Muslim Brotherhood does not share these national security views, it has had to recognize the central role of the security establishment when it comes to dealing with Hamas and Israel. The rapidlydeteriorating security situation in Sinai reinforced the position of the security establishment as opposed to that of the Brotherhood, with regard to setting the security policy for its two neighbors to the East. Essam Haddad, Morsi’s national security adviser, articulated the Brotherhood’s new policy in rare candor, saying that Egypt “will not tolerate the two-way smuggled arms through the tunnels that is destabilizing the Sinai Peninsula.”
In addition to the security aspects, political dynamics have worked in favor of keeping the status quo. In stark contrast to the Mubarak years, Israel is no longer an issue of public debate in Cairo. It has been replaced by more pressing challenges such as the economy and governance. With the Muslim Brotherhood already in power, the strongest and most vociferous critic of the treaty has been removed. During the November 2012 crisis, the Brotherhood did not face any substantial domestic opposition to the course of action it chose to follow. No one has urged Morsi to take a more assertive stance in the face of Israel’s continuing aerial bombardments of Gaza. He has, so far, paid no political price for adopting literally the same policy that Mubarak was long criticized for.
For decades, politics of the Arab-Israeli conflict were intertwined with domestic politics in Israel and the Arab countries. The conflict was repeatedly used as a means to achieve political gain through attacking the national or religious credentials of political foes.
Ironically, this sinister dynamic stopped with two right-wing governments at the helm in both Egypt and Israel. With their nationalist-religious credentials, the Egyptian and Israeli governments are immune to internal criticism of their respective foreign policy stances. Both Morsi and Netanyahu are politically secure to conduct business as usual.
Gamal Abuel Hassan is an Egyptian freelance journalist who writes on regional and foreign policy issues. He writes a weekly column for Al-Masry Al-Youm, Egypt’s leading daily newspaper.
yamit82 Said:
It was fantastic how they took the crisis and turned it into an opportunity. Crossing the canal, if they had not been reigned in they may have taken the Canal. They were not far from Cairo and Damascus. What a joy to see Israeli tanks in cairo and Damascus. I hope that when they get the opportunity again that they capitalize on it and keep what they get, that they want.
yamit82 Said:
Please elaborate, don’t know this.
David Sternlight Said:
Caroline Glick: Whither the ‘Arab Spring’?
Whether I am a canary in the coal mine, chicken little or the kid who cried wolf? I submit from a military POV the Yom Kippur war was a greater military victory than the 6 day war, yet we here in Israel are still traumatized by that war. We lost our innocence in that war and realized we could no longer trust our elected and military leaders who betrayed us. Those who betrayed us were not unlike yourself, the same mentality of stupidity and arrogance. You like all of your pseudo intellectual comrades have never experienced your collective and individual mea culpa. You are all unrepentant in your past erroneous thinking, and advice which you offered probably mostly for remuneration.
You are living proof that the adage of the worth of FREE ADVICE… is not always true; sometimes free is better and truer than advice bought and paid for. I still have pieces of shrapnel in my leg after all these years a constant reminder of our wars with Egypt in 67 and 73 not to mention the war of attrition. While other countries my threaten we have actually fought 5 major wars with Egypt since 1948.
Tonight begins our annual commemoration of Our Holocaust and Heroes remembrance day. An annual event. This day in Israel emulates in many ways Yom Kippur. We or at least some of us recall that the Jews especially the leadership of all stripes refused to heed the warnings of those who predicted what was cumming in Europe. They rejected the free advice of those who knew and accepted positions closer to what they wanted to hear.
Stupid Jews always pay the price for their own stupidity and arrogance. Did your heroes like Golda, Dayan and a host of other Israeli icons know better? Know Best? They murdered thousands of Israeli soldiers and reservists needlessly, almost lost the whole country because they were frightened little Judonim. In 1973 Israel had operational nukes and rather than use them to save our soldiers and country from being overrun in the first days, Dayan was about to capitulate to the Egyptians and Syrians and hand them the keys.
Egypt was our mortal enemy since before 48 and are no less today. Sadat put them onto the military and financial American ATM, Mubarak more or less followed on the path but they were never allies, only an enemy who temporarily were non confrontational while building it’s military strength with American and Western help, so that they hope one day to defeat Israel. America even sold Cruise missile to Egypt while denying them to Israel.. Best thing to ever happen, as we built our own and sold them to other armies including China. America denied Israel AWACS so we built better and cheaper ones sold them to Chin and India. The best thing that ever happened to us was the Arab Boycott and the American arms Boycott to Israel.
We will war with Egypt again and IMO it’s not a matter of if but when.
I am wondering more and more whether Yamit82, rather than being the canary in the coal mine is instead Chicken Little, or worse, the boy who cried “Wolf!”
Is Bibi building a boxcar factory? Camp Paradise in the Sinai. You get a loaf of bread if you show up on time at the train station.
Is Ankara the new retirement home for traitors?
I also suspect somewhere along the line that Mossad told the MB:
“Nice dam there (in Aswan). It would be a shame if something happened to it…”
Egyptian Pres. Railed Against Doing Business With America
Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi recently accepted millions of dollars in U.S. aid. See what he had to say a few short years ago about doing business with America.
Egypt Is Perched on the Precipice of Chaos
Judith Miller
Judith Miller’s Perspective: The Cairo subway was one of Hosni Mubarak’s proudest achievements. Built at a cost of several billion dollars in the late 1980s, it reflected Egypt’s ancient civilization and modern Egypt’s national pride. Air-conditioned in summer, quiet as a pharaoh’s tomb, the subway was well-lit and beautifully appointed. Display boxes of ancient Egyptian artifacts lined its platforms. A special police unit kept the stations clean, safe, and graffiti-free.
Then came the Egyptian revolution in January and February 2011. Today, the subway that transports roughly 4 million passengers a day throughout this vast city of roughly 17 million is a wreck. The tile walls of its central hub, Tahrir Square — the epicenter of the protests that forced Mubarak from power — are chipped and filthy. Its platforms are strewn with litter. A main passageway from the platform to the square has been dark for weeks; no one has changed the burned-out bulbs. There are no policemen in sight. The passageways stink. Read More
Otter is correct.
The Egyptians for the moment need Obama and his ATM more than ever before. So we can assume for the moment they will behave themselves. Like Turkey the Egyptian military owns most of the profitable heavy Industry in Egypt and the Senior officer corp is largely dependent on that resource for most of their income and power. The economic collapse of Egypt in the past couple of years has them sitting on edge.
The writer does not mention that those officers and security people that Israel knew and had close ties to are now mostly all gone due to purges by Morsi. There are now MB loyalists in the top tier of the Egyptian Army. According to reports by Israeli analysts here there is still a lot of Arms getting through the Egyptian sieve and the Bedouins and Al-qaeda have grown in strength and audacity in Sinai without any apparent serious attempts by Egypt to rein them in. They seem to be doing barely enough to keep America off their backs and they always complain of restrictions of manpower and equipment as a reason. They are still demanding Israel amend the treaty in allowing them more access militarily in Sinai so here they are playing a double game. They want back into Sinai militarily even if it’s by incremental growth and need the terrorists there as a club to beat Israel into agreement.
If Israel does not add three more armor and mechanized divisions in the Negev facing Egypt then it will be a case of criminal negligence because it can take years of training and preparation to be able to meet a serious attack by Egypt. Israel since the the Camp David accords has mostly ignored the possibility of a Southern threat and concentrated their efforts and investment in other areas. The Israel Army has not fought massive ground war since 1973. But worse is that they have not been training for one.
Our political and security elites should be considering Egypt as our most dangerous existential threat and be preparing for the next round. If it doesn’t materialize we will have lost nothing. Egypt for Israel becomes most dangerous when the regime-is threatened internally and they will as in the past scapegoat Israel as a MOB diversion.
Just wait until the internal crisis abates, and you’ll have Egypt making demands for a “revision of the treaty” again. The author admits that much when he says, “Israel is no longer an issue of public debate in Cairo. It has been replaced by more pressing challenges such as the economy and governance.” ~~~ That’s right. The MB regime wants to establish itself firmly in power, obtaining even more financial and military aid, normalizing the economy, and silencing the opposition. It’s in the process of doing all that. The ultimate goal is that of being secure enough to officially abrogate the treaty and to eventually launch another war against Israel. That’s Egypt’s plan, and it will never change, regardless of their ups and downs and regime changes. ~~~~~ In the meantime the much touted “peace treaty” was and continues to be a truce at best. Had there not been a “treaty,” Israel would have the very real protection of the Sinai to help maintain peace. That’s the real picture. All the rest is spin.